Superior Soft Water Company v. Utah State Tax Commission : Brief of Petitioner by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Superior Soft Water Company v. Utah State Tax
Commission : Brief of Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lynn P. Heward; Delwin T. Pond; Attorneys for Petitioner.
Susan L. Barnum; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Superior Soft Water Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, No. 920337 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3271
^•y **.-:***»# 
5, 
.AT/ 
DO^.vfcr NC. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SUPERIOR SOFT WATER COMPANY, 
VS. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Petitioner, 92-0337-
Respondent. 
Case No. 92 CA 
(Supreme Court 
Case No. 920119) 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
OF THE FINAL DECISION 
OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION 15 
SUSAN L. BARNUM #5444 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
36 South State Street, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 533-3200 
LYNN P. HEWARD #14 79 
DELWIN T. POND #2623 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
923 East 5350 South #E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Teleohone: 264-8040 
MAY291992 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTION , 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW . . 1 
STATUTES, ETC., TO BE INTERPRETED . 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE , 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS . , 1 2 
ARGUMENT . . . . 14 
1. It was unreasonable for respondent to 
require petitioner to collect much more sales 
tax from a buyer who purchased a water softener 
after even a minimal period of leasing it than 
from a buyer who bought it without first 
leasing it at all. 
14 
2. Respondent failed to comply with the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act in requiring 
petitioner to remit much more sales tax for 
each buyer who purchased a water softener 
after even a minimal period of leasing it than 
respondent required for a buyer who bought it 
without first leasing it at ail where no rule 
covering the situation had been promulgated. 
Ill 
3. It was unreasonable for respondent to 
require petitioner to remit much more sales 
tax than petitioner had collected from buyers 
who each purchased a water softener after even 
a minimal period of leasing it where in good 
faith petitioner had collected the same amount 
of sales tax as respondent's rules required be 
collected from a buyer who bought a water 
softener without first leasing it. 
4. Respondent violated oetitioner's due 
process rights by requiring petitioner to 
remit much more sales tax than petitioner had 
collected from buyers who each purchased a 
water softener after even a minimal period of 
leasing it where in good faith petitioner had 
collected the same amount of sales tax as 
respondent's rules required be collected from 
a buyer who bought a water softener without 
first leasing it. 
I V 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Athay v. State, Dept. of Business Regulation, 626 P.2d 
965 (Utah 1981) 18, 24 
Lorenc v. Call, 789 P.2d 46 (Utah App. 1990) . . . 25-26 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P. 2d 581 
(Utah 1991) 1-2, 23 
Plateau Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720 
(Utah 1990) 18 
Signore v. City of McKeesport, Pa., 680 F.Supp. 200 
(W.D.Pa. 1988) 25 
State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986) . . . 24-25 
State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987) 24 
Williams v. Public Service Com'n of Utah, 720 P.2d 773 
(Utah 1986) 20-21 
STATUTES, ETC. 
Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the United States 
Constitution 4, 23-24 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution . . . 4, 22 
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code . 4, 23 
Section 1988 of Title 42 of the United States Code . 4, 23 
Section 59-1-505 of the Utah Code 12 
V 
Subsection 59-12-102(13)(b) of the Utah Code . . . . 3 
Section 63-46a-3 of the Utah Code 4, 17 
Subsection 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii ) of the Utah Code . . . . 1 
Subsection 78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code 1 
Subsection 78-2a-3(2) (k) of the Utah Code 1 
Rule R865-19-32S of the Utah Administrative Code . 3, 14, 16 
Rule R865-19-51S of the Utah Administrative Code . 3, 9, 15 
Rule R865-19-58S of the Utah Administrative Code 3, 6, 14-16 
Rule R865-19-78S of the Utah Administrative Code . 4, 15-16 
1 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court had jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to Subsection 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii ) of the Utah Code, since the matter 
involves a review a final order in formal adjudicative proceedings 
originating with the State Tax Commission. The Supreme Court 
transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Subsection 
78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code. The Court of Appeals now has jurisdiction 
in this matter pursuant to Subsection 78-2a-3(2)(k) of the Utah Code. 
Jurisdiction was invoked by means of a Petition for Writ 
of Review filed in compliance with Rule 14. (a) of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, namely, the Petition for Writ of Review dated 
March 6, 1992 and filed on Monday March 9, 1992, seeking review of 
the respondent's Final Decision issued on February 6, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case was initiated by or before the respondent agency 
before January 1, 1988. Therefore, case law on the standard of 
review applicable before that date applies to this matter. Morton 
lntfl, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
1. Was it unreasonable for respondent to require petitioner 
to collect much more sales tax from a buyer who purchased a water 
softener after even a minimal period of leasing it than from a 
buyer who bought it without first leasing it at all? This involves 
some deference to respondent's expertise in the interpretation 
of the statutes which respondent is empowered to administer. 
Id. at 586. 
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2. Did respondent fail to comply with the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act in requiring petitioner to remit 
much more sales tax for each buyer who purchased a water softener 
after even a minimal period of leasing it than respondent required 
for a buyer who bought it without first leasing it at all where no 
rule covering the situation had been promulgated? This is a 
question of statutory interpretation, with no deference to respondent's 
expertise. Idl. at 585. 
3. Was it unreasonable for respondent to require petitioner 
to remit much more sales tax than petitioner had collected from 
buyers who each purchased a water softener after even a minimal 
period of leasing it where in good faith petitioner had collected 
the same amount of sales tax as respondent's rules required be 
collected from a buyer who bought a water softener without first 
leasing it? This involves some deference to respondent's expertise 
in the interpretation of the statutes which respondent is empowered 
to administer. Id. at 586. 
4. Did respondent violate petitioner's due process 
rights by requiring petitioner to remit much more sales tax than 
petitioner had collected from buyers who each purchased a water 
softener after even a minimal period of leasing it where in good faith 
petitioner had collected the same amount of sales tax as respondent's 
rules required be collected from a buyer who bought a water softener 
without first leasing it? This is a question of constitutional 
interpretation, with no deference to respondent's expertise. 
Id. at 585. 
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STATUTES, ETC., TO BE INTERPRETED 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative 
consist of the following: 
Sales and Use Tax Act, Chapter 12 of Title 59 of the 
Utah Code, and particularly subsection 59-12-102(13)(b): 
"Tangible personal property" does not include: 
(i) real estate or any interest therin or 
improvements thereon; 
Rules promulgated in connection with that Chapter including 
the following: 
Rule R865-19-32S: 
A. The lessor shall compute sales or use tax on amounts 
received or charged pursuant to rental or lease agreements 
which are made in lieu of outright sales. ... 
B. ... Examples of taxable leases would be neon signs 
and custom made signs on the premises of the lessee .... 
Rule R865-19-51S: 
D. Labor to install tangible personal property to 
real property is exempt, whether the personal property 
becomes part of the realty or not. ... 
E. Tangible personal property which is attached to real 
property, but remains personal property, is subject to 
sales tax on the retail selling price of the personal 
property, and installation charges are exempt if separately 
stated. If the retailer does not segregate the selling 
price and installation charges, the sales tax applies to 
the entire sales price, including installation charges. 
Rule R865-19-58S: 
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real property 
contractors and repaimen of real property is generally 
subject to tax. 
1. The person who converts the personal property into 
real property is the consumer of the personal property 
since he is the last one to own it as personal property. 
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Rule R865-19-78S: 
B. ... Charges for labor to install personal property 
to realty are not subject to tax . . . 
Section 63-46a-3, Utah Code: 
(2) In addition to other rulemaking required by law, each 
agency shall make rules when agency action: 
(a) authorizes, requires, or prohibits an action; 
(b) provides or prohibits a material benefit; 
(c) applies to a class of persons or another agency; 
and 
(d) is explicitly or implicitly authorized by statute, 
(3) Rulemaking is also required when an agency issues a 
written interpretation of a state or federal legal mandate. 
Due process clause of the Utah Constitution, Article 1, 
Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Due process clause of the United States Constitution, 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law .... 
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceedings for redress. ... 
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988: 
... In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision 
of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, ... the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other 
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the 
costs. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner had manufactured and then sold and leased 
water softeners for a period of about 15 years. After about the 
first 5 years, petitioner learned that it had been collecting too 
much sales tax. It confirmed with respondent at that time that 
when a water softener was sold, it became oart of the real property. 
Therefore, petitioner had been the consumer of the materials and a 
sales or use tax would only apply to the cost of the materials 
petitioner had used. 
After a quitting that business for about 14 years, 
oetitioner resumed its water softener business as before. At that 
time petitioner contacted respondent to make sure it should continue 
to collect and remit sales and use taxes as it had done before. 
However, after a couple of years, respondent audited oetitioner for 
1985 and 1986, claimed that a deficiency existed for this oeriod, 
and eventually collected more than $15,000 from oetitioner because 
of additional taxes respondent asserted should have been collected. 
Petitioner had employed a marketing strategy of leasing 
the water softeners, and then after a couole of months, when the 
advantages of soft water had become evident to the customer, 
petitioner would often be able to sell the unit. Petitioner had 
collected and remitted the same amount of tax when a sale resulted 
during the initial months of a lease as it had for any other sale. 
Respondent demanded and obtained four or five times as much tax as 
was collected, claiming that since there had been a period of 
leasing, a sales tax was owing on the entire sales price, not just 
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on the cost of the materials. 
The facts in more detail are as follows, with citations 
to the Record from the Agency (R.) and the Transcript of Proceedings 
(T. ): 
1. The tax in question is sales tax, and the audit 
period at issue is January 1, 1985 through December 31, 1986. R. 4. 
2. The Petitioner has three different types of transactions 
with its customers who want a water softener unit. Water softeners 
are provided on one of the following bases: 
(1) The water softener is leased to the customer 
on a monthly rental agreement, which usually results in a rental 
period of two to three years. Sales tax is imposed on the monthly 
lease payment as it is received by the petitioner, and there is no 
dispute between the parties as to how these transactions are taxed. 
(2) The water softener is sold to the customer on 
a furnish and install contract. On this type of transaction, the 
petitioner furnishes the materials and supplies, and installs them 
as a water softener on the premises of the customer. Pursuant to 
Commission Rule R865-19-58S, the petitioner pays sales and use tax 
on its cost and materials, i.e., petitioner either pays sales tax 
to the vendor when materials are purchased, or if the materials 
are purchased without the payment of sales tax, the petitioner 
pays use tax when the materials are attached to real property. 
There is no dispute between the parties as to how these transactions 
are taxed. 
(3) The water softener is leased to the customer 
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for a period of time, but prior to the expiration of the lease the 
customer purchases the water softener. In relation to this appeal 
and pursuant to a special promotion of the petitioner, many purchases 
were during the first three months of the lease, and customers 
were given credit against the purchase price for the payments 
which they had made on the lease. The transactions which are in 
dispute in this proceeding are those where the purchase occurred 
during the period of the original lease, regardless of whether the 
purchase occurred after only three months or after a much lonqer 
period of time. R. 48-49. 
3. The owners of petitioner were previously in the 
water softener business from 1956 to 1971 and they re-entered the 
water softener business in 1985, always doing business as "Superior 
Soft Water." T. 19-20. 
4. From 1956 until 1961 petitioner collected and remitted 
sales tax on the entire amount of retail sales of water softeners. 
At that point petitioner learned from a competitor that water 
softeners were considered to be real property and sales tax should 
not be collected on the total sales price. Petitioner therefore 
requested a hearing with the respondent which hearing confirmed 
that the water softener was considered to be real property and 
should not be taxed. R. 6, T. 24. 
5. Prior to that time, in about 1959 respondent had 
audited petitioner, but had not informed petitioner that sales tax 
was being improperly collected. T. 25-26, 47. 
6. When petitioner was told at the hearing that taxes 
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should not have been collected on sales of water softeners, petitioner 
asked respondent about a refund of the tax improperly collected 
and remitted. Respondent would only refund the extra tax it had 
received if the refund was passed on to the purchasers. Petitioner 
would receive no benefit but would have to provide the labor to 
find the purchasers and distribute the refunded money. In view of 
this burden on petitioner, petitioner declined respondent's offer. 
T. 48-49. 
7. Petitioner did not ask respondent if petitioner 
would have to collect a different amount of sales or use tax when 
a sale took place prior to the end of a lease, and respondent 
never suggested it would be treated differently from any other 
sale. R. 6. An officer of petitioner thought the only issue was 
whether a water softener was real or personal property. T. 44. 
8. Before recommencing operations in 1985, Gerald 
B. Lambourne, one of the proprietors of petitioner, contacted the 
respondent by telephone to confirm, for sales and use tax purposes, 
the correct sales tax treatment of the sale and installation of 
soft water systems on commercial and residential real property. 
He was informed that water softeners became part of the real 
property and were not subject to sales tax, but instead a use tax 
was imposed on the cost of materials used in the construction of the 
water softener unit. This advice was consistent with his orior 
practice and his prior understanding of the law. T. 35-36. 
9. In the marketing of water softeners, it was important 
for the customer to experience the advantages of soft water before 
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having to commit to a purchase. For that reason, petitioner 
frequently entered into a lease of a water softener with the 
expectation of being able to convert the lease to a sale very 
soon thereafter. T. 41. 
10. Had petitioner known it would, upon conversion, 
have to charge the customer a sales tax on the entire price, it 
would at least have separated the cost of the water softener 
from the cost of its installation [to obtain the tax benefit under 
Part D of Rule R865-19-51S]. T. 40-41. 
11. In view of respondent's position that a water 
softener is real property if sold without having been leased 
first, and is personal property if first leased for any time at 
all, petitioner has found it more practical to allow the prospective 
customer to experience soft water by means of a free trial period 
rather than by means of a lease. T. 43. 
12. During the audit period, one of respondent's auditors 
purchased a water softener from petitioner after a period of 
leasing and was not charged sales tax. He may not have read the 
sales contract, but in any event he did not notify petitioner 
that petitioner was following an incorrect course of action in 
failing to charge sales tax. T. 55-65. 
13. Also during the audit period, petitioner had no 
guidance from any rule covering the tax treatment of a sale following 
some initial period of leasing. T. 34, 64-65, 68-70. 
14. The original audit report, dated March 12, 1987, 
stated that $45,969.40 in tax, $4,596.94 in penalty, and $5,714.33 
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interest was owing. A subsequent audit adjustment on August 16, 
1991 had reduced that amount to $11,855.97 in tax, no penalty, and 
$2,071.03 in interest. The resoondent's Auditing Division applied 
petitioner's February 16, 1988 payment of $3,000.00 against all of 
the interest and $928.97 of the tax obligation. Then the interest 
was updated from February 16, 1988 and that amount was $4,695.32, 
as of September 15, 1991. (Interest accrued daily at $3.59). 
Therefore, the respondent's Auditing Division asserted that the 
total amount owing as of February 15, 1991, was $15,622.32. R. 19 
15. Petitioner appealed the assessed amounts and an 
informal hearing was held on January 6, 1988, David Angerhofer, 
Hearing Officer, presiding. R. 117. 
16. On May 5, 1988, the respondent issued its informal 
decision in this matter, including the following excerpts: 
Water softeners which are first leased to a 
customer and then sold to that customer are 
subject to tax on the monthly rental payments 
for the duration of the lease, and are subject 
to sales and use tax on the residual sales 
price of the later sale of the water softener 
to that customer. 
... 
Water softeners whch are first leased and then 
sold to a customer become part of the realty 
at the time of sale. 
The Auditing Division is hereby ordered to 
adjust its assessment in accordance with this 
decision. R. 119. 
17. On September 16, 1988, oetitioner's accountant, 
Brian C. McGavin, C.P.A., wrote to the respondent on behalf of 
petitioner requesting a clarification of the respondent's informal 
decision. R. 113. James E. Harward, Hearing Officer, answered on 
11 
January 18, 1989, including the following: 
3. The sale of a soft water softener unit to 
a customer after a lease has expired is also a 
taxable transaction. The price paid, typically 
the residual value of the water softener at 
the conclusion of the lease, should have tax 
computed and charged thereon. R. 112. 
18. At some point after January 18, 1989, Gerald Lambourne 
of petitioner requested clarification of James Harward's January 
18, 1989 letter. This was answered by James Harward on Aoril 26, 
1989. He first quoted the said paragraph 3, and then stated that: 
[W]hen the water softener is sold and installed 
by you, you're classified as a real prooerty 
contractor and the end consumer, therefore, 
you should be paying use tax on your cost of 
the water softener because you are installing 
the water softener on real prooerty. It 
should be treated the same as an outright sale 
of the water softener which you install for a 
customer in real prooerty. R. 111. 
19. Respondent's Auditing Division filed a Motion 
for Reconsideration and Clarification of Informal Decision in this 
matter on September 22, 1989. R. 94-110. 
20. A clarification hearing on the respondent's informal 
decision was held on February 6, 1991. R. 48. 
21. On February 27, 1991, the respondent issued its 
Order in this matter, clarifying that the decision was meant 
to uphold completely the assessment of the Auditing Division, but 
waiving any tax not collected because of a misinterpretation by 
petitioner of the respondent's decision of May 5, 1988. R. 48-54. 
A copy of that Order dated February 27, 1991 is attached hereto. 
22. A Formal Hearing was then held on this matter on 
October 29, 1991 before Paul F. Iwasaki, Presiding Officer. R. 4. 
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23. In a Brief and Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
submitted before the hearing, as well as in argument at the hearing, 
petitioner presented arguments showing that there was an unreasonably 
large additional amount of tax being charged (R. 29, T. 75-76), there 
had been no pertinent rule promulgated (R. 29, T. 75), it was 
unreasonable to charge petitioner more than petitioner had collected, 
since petition had acted in good faith (R. 30-31, T. 77, 82), and 
it would violate petitioner's constitutional due process rights to 
charge petitioner more than petitioner had collected (R. 29, 
T. 77, 83). 
24. The respondent's Final Decision of February 6, 1992 
affirmed the prior Informal Decision and subsequent Order, noting 
that since the taxable treatment of the conversion of leases to 
sales had not come up in discussions between the petitioner and 
the respondent, petitioner could not have relied upon the respondent's 
advice to its detriment. R. 8-9. 
25. In order for petitioner to avail itself of judicial 
review of that Final Decision, oetitioner had to pay respondent 
the full amount respondent calculated was owing, pursuant to Section 
59-1-505 of the Utah Code. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. It was unreasonable for respondent to require petitioner 
to collect much more sales tax from a buyer who purchased a water 
softener after even a minimal period of leasing it than from a 
buyer who bought it without first leasing it at all. The rules 
which governed how much sales and use tax was to be paid when a sale 
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was made in the first instance would also apply in the case of a 
sale after a period of leasing. 
2. Respondent failed to comply with the Utah administrative 
Rulemaking Act in requiring petitioner to remit much more sales 
tax for each buyer who purchased a water softener after even a 
minimal period of leasing it than respondent required for a buyer 
who bought it without first leasing it at all where no rule covering 
the situation had been promulgated. The promulgation of a rule 
was statutorily required in this case since the agency required an 
action by the taxpayer, it orohibited a material benefit, and it 
was an agency interpretation of a state legal mandate. 
3. It was unreasonable for respondent to require petitioner 
to remit much more sales tax than petitioner had collected from 
buyers who each ourchased a water softener after even a minimal 
period of leasing it where in good faith petitioner had collected 
the same amount of sales tax as respondent's rules required be 
collected from a buyer who bought a water softener without first 
leasing it. Petitioner had collected all of the tax it had been 
advised to collect after diligent inquiry. It was harsh and 
unjust to retroactively require petitioner to remit more than it 
had collected in good faith. 
4. Respondent violated petitioner's due process rights 
by requiring petitioner to remit much more sales tax than petitioner 
had collected from buyers who each purchased a water softener 
after even a minimal period of leasing it where in good faith 
petitioner had collected the same amount of sales tax as respondent's 
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rules required be collected from a buyer who bought a water softener 
without first leasing it. The lack of rules and other guidelines 
left petitioner's duty unconstitutionally vague. In light of this 
lack of clarityf petitioner was deprived of its property in violation 
of its due orocess rights. Petitioner thus has a cause of action 
under the Civil Rights Act and is entitled to an award of attorney 
fees thereunder. 
ARGUMENT 
1. IT WAS UNREASONABLE FOR RESPONDENT TO REQUIRE PETITIONER 
TO COLLECT MUCH MORE SALES TAX FROM A BUYER WHO PURCHASED A WATER 
SOFTENER AFTER EVEN A MINIMAL PERIOD OF LEASING IT THAN FROM A 
BUYER WHO BOUGHT IT WITHOUT FIRST LEASING IT AT ALL. 
In a normal sale of a water softener, the difference 
between the cost of the materials and the total sales orice is the 
amount to install personal property to realty and is not subject 
to tax. It is only reasonable that this rationale would also apply 
where the water softener is leased for a period of time before an 
option to buy the water softener is exercised. 
It is acknowledged by both parties that when petitioner 
sells a water softener and installs it onto the premises, it is 
not subject to sales tax. Instead, petitioner is required to oay 
use tax on the materials used in the water softener because petitioner 
was the consumer of those materials. 
Rule R865-19-58S of the Rules of the Commission provides 
in part A: 
1. The person who converts the personal property into 
real property is the consumer of the personal property 
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since he is the last one to own it as personal property. 
In the case of water softeners, petitioner is the last 
one to own the property as personalty. Therefore petitioner is the 
consumer of the property and is subject to tax on the cost of the 
materials. However, petitioner is not subject to tax on the 
balance of the total sales price, because that represents the 
charge for labor to install the personal property to the realty, 
and Rule R865-19-78S provides in part: 
Charges for labor to install personal property to realty 
are not subject to tax . . .(Emphasis added). 
Further, Rule R865-19-51S provides in relevant part: 
0. Labor to install tangible personal property to real 
prooerty is exempt, whether the personal property becomes 
part of the realty or not. (Emphasis added). 
In this proceeding, the transactions in issue are those 
in which an option to buy was exercised after beginning the transaction 
as a lease. Tax was correctly collected and remitted on all lease 
payments. Petitioner submits that it also correctly paid the tax 
on the cost of all materials it attached or installed onto real 
property. Rule 58S makes petitioner the consumer of that property, 
and petitioner has complied with the rule by paying the tax. Rule 
78S provides that "Charges for labor to install personal property 
to realty are not subject to tax . . . " (Emphasis added). Those 
charges for labor to install personal property to realty are the 
only charges on which sales or use tax has not been paid, and the 
respondent's own Rule 78S says they "are not subject to tax". 
Rule 51S provides almost exactly the same thing and concludes that 
labor to install personal property to real property "is exempt". 
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Thus, the audit assessment by the respondent cannot be 
sustained without the violation of respondent's own rules. That 
is not legally permissible so the assessment must be reversed, 
2. RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE 
RULEMAKING ACT IN REQUIRING PETITIONER TO REMIT MUCH MORE SALES 
TAX FOR EACH BUYER WHO PURCHASED A WATER SOFTENER AFTER EVEN A 
MINIMAL PERIOD OF LEASING IT THAN RESPONDENT REQUIRED FOR A BUYER 
WHO BOUGHT IT WITHOUT FIRST LEASING IT AT ALL WHERE NO RULE COVERING 
THE SITUATION HAD BEEN PROMULGATED. 
The respondent could not interpret the law as it did 
without first adootina a new rule. 
The respondent has adopted a rule to tax the leases of 
tangible oersonal property (Rule R865-19-32S), it has adooted 
a rule to tax the sale and installation of tangible oersonal 
property to real property by contractors such as oetitioner (Rule 
R865-19-58S), and it has adooted a rule to exempt the labor and 
installation costs to attach tangible personal property to real 
property (Rules R865-19-51S and R865-19-78S). However, there 
is no rule anywhere in the rules of the respondent which requires 
tax to be paid on the total price of the transaction, including 
the cost of labor to install the tangible oersonal oroperty to the 
real property, when a lease is converted to a sales and installation 
agreement. If the respondent wants to impose tax on those transactions 
at four or five times the rate of a straight sale, the respondent 
must first approve that conceot and adopt a rule to give notice to 
all taxpayers of the requirement. 
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Relevant portions of Section 63-46a-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
provide: 
(2) In addition to other rulemaking required by law, each 
agency shall make rules when agency action: 
(a) authorizes, requires, or prohibits an action; 
(b) provides or prohibits a material benefit; 
(c) applies to a class of persons or another agency; 
and 
(d) is explicitly or implicitly authorized by statute. 
(3) Rulemaking is also required when an agency issues a 
written interpretation of a state or federal legal mandate. 
In this case, the prooosed agency action requires an 
action by the taxpayer, it prohibits a material benefit, and it is 
an agency interpretation of a state legal mandate. The agency 
(Tax Commission) is clearly required to adopt rules prior to 
taking the proposed action. Without the agency first adopting 
rules, taxpayers are not given any advance notice of the requirements 
of the agency. That is precisely the problem in this proceeding. 
The petitionei . lied the Tax Commission and was either given some 
erroneous advi or the policy of the Tax Commission was changed 
without proper / giving notice to the taxpaying public through 
the rulemaking process. In either event, the problem could have 
either been prevented or the policy could have been enforced if 
the respondent had properly adopted a rule. In the absence of 
such a rule, the respondent's Auditing Division cannot pull such a 
policy out of the dark closet and impose it on unsuspecting taxpayers. 
It is a wrong, which so far has improperly cost this taxpayer 
more than $15,000.00 which it did not collect on the sale of the 
water softeners. 
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This rationale was set forth by the Utah Supreme Court 
in the case of Athay v. State, Dept. of Business Regulation, 626 
P.2d 965 (Utah 1981). In that case, the necessity for clear and 
comprehensive administrative rules was emphasized. 
The legislative grant of authority to the 
administrative agency is necessarily in general 
language. It is the responsibility of the 
administrative body to formulate, oublish and 
make available to concerned oersons rules 
which are sufficiently definite and clear that 
persons of ordinary intelligence will be able 
to understand and abide by them. Ij3. at 968. 
An example of where there already existed sufficient 
clarity, making a rule unnecessary, was Eound in the case of 
Plateau Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 P. 2d 720 (Utah 1990 ) . 
In that case, the agency interpreted and enforced a 
lease provision. The lease had a royalty orovision which set 
forth two different rates, and specified that whichever rate was 
higher would be the applicable rate. 
Certain lessees asked the Court to re "\±ra the agency to 
make a rule before collecting the higher rate. The Supreme Court 
found that there was no need for the promulgation of a rule in 
order for the agency "to rely on a known lease orovision." JEd. at 
731. As the Court had already found, "The language of the lease 
provision is clear. The intent of the parties was that the higher 
of the two rates should be paid the State." Id., at 726. 
The facts of the Plateau case certainly contrast with 
those of the instant matter. There was no clarity at all in any 
statute, rule, agreement, decision, or oral communication of the 
respondent regarding the tax to be collected when a lease of a 
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water softener was converted to a sale. The complete lack of 
clarity became so apparent that respondent's Auditing Division 
requested an interpretation of the first effort made by the respondent 
to address the subject of taxing water softeners purchased after 
an initial period of leasing. R. 94. 
Furthermore, the oosition of the respondent's auditing 
division constituted a change in policy which could not be done 
without first adopting a rule. 
Currently, as stated above, there is no rule in the 
rules of the respondent which impose tax on the full price when a 
lease transaction is converted to a sale and installation to real 
property. To now impose tax in that manner constitutes a change 
of policy by the respondent. 
Mr. Lambourne had been in the water softener business 
with petitioner from the first. When the petitioner recommenced 
that business , Mr. Lambourne called the respondent and was informed 
that the sale of water softeners was treated as attachments to 
real property, which would mean that use tax would be paid on the 
cost of the materials attached to real property. That representation 
was the way he had previously paid tax on water softeners, it was 
the way he understood it had always been done, and it was the way 
he was now being told to do it in the future. 
Then, when the audit was performed by the Auditing 
Division on petitioner, the policy had changed and petitioner was 
being hit with at least an $11,000.00 assessment. The respondent 
had never adopted or even proposed a rule change, and the public 
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had never been given notice of any such change, but the change in 
policy was being imposed on petitioner to the tune of over $11,000. 00 
without any opportunity to first collect the tax from the persons 
purchasing the water softeners. 
Such changes in policy without first going through the 
rulemaking process is clearly forbidden by the statute cited 
above. In addition, in Williams v. Public Service Com'n of Utah, 
720 P. 2d 773 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that an 
agency of the State of Utah could not change its long-established 
policy without first following the mandates of the Utah administrative 
Rule Making Act. In that case, the Supreme Court said: 
Under all these circumstances, we conclude 
that the Commission cannot reverse its long-settled 
position ... and announce a fundamental oolicy 
change without following the requirements of 
the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act. See, 
e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 
(9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 999, 
103 S.Ct. 358, 74 L.Ed.2d 394 (1982), see also 
2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise Sec. 
7:25, at 125 (2d ed. 1978) . These requirements 
were not met. Nonparties were not given notice 
of the Commission's intention to reconsider 
its long-held position.... And the November 
adjudicative hearing certainly cannot be considered 
an adequate substitute for a rule making 
proceeding. Many of the protections provided 
for by the Act were missing from that proceeding , 
including adequate advance notices to all 
affected parties , an opportunity to participate, 
and an opportunity to comment on the proposed 
rule. U.C.A., 1953, Sec. 63-46a-4 (2d 
Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978, Supo. 1985). Because the 
requirements of the Act were not satisfied, the 
rule is vacated and the matter is remanded for 
further proceedings. Id. at 777. (Emphasis 
added). 
Consistent with the Williams case, "the Commission 
cannot reverse its long-settled position and announce a fundamental 
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policy change without following the requirements of the Utah 
Administrative Rule Making Act." Taxpayers "were not given notice 
of the Commission ' s intention to reconsider its long-held position. " 
The "protection provided for by the Act were missing, including 
adequate advance notices to all affected parties , an opportunity to 
participate, and an opportunity to comment." 
That is precisely the problem in this proceeding with 
this petitioner. 
3. IT WAS UNREASONABLE FOR RESPONDENT TO REQUIRE PETITIONER 
TO REMIT MUCH MORE SALES TAX THAN PETITIONER HAD COLLECTED FROM 
BUYERS WHO EACH PURCHASED A WATER SOFTENER AFTER EVEN A MINIMAL 
PERIOD OF LEASING IT WHERE IN GOOD FAITH PETITIONER HAD COLLECTED 
THE SAME AMOUNT OF SALES TAX AS RESPONDENT'S RULES REQUIRED BE 
COLLECTED FROM A BUYER WHO BOUGHT A WATER SOFTENER WITHOUT FIRST 
LEASING IT. 
In the attached Order dated February 27, 1991, affirmed 
on page 5 of the Final Decision sought to be reviewed, the respondent 
affirmed the assessment for taxes for the audit period, 1985 
through 1986. R. 8, 52. 
The Order then acknowledged on page 5 that petitioner 
may have in good faith misinterpreted the Informal Decision dated 
May 5, 1988, and therefore relieved petitioner from paying the 
taxes it had not collected as a result of its misinterpretation of 
that Decision. R. 52-53. 
However, petitioner had evidenced good faith to at least 
the same extent before May 5, 1988. It had at one time collected 
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more than was required by law, collecting and remitting sales tax 
on the water softeners sold and installed brand new in real property. 
T. 24. It had been diligent in contacting respondent to make sure 
that it was collecting the appropriate amount of tax. T. 24, 36. 
The only possible accusation against petitioner would be 
that it did not ask the right question. Its principal did not ask 
about the situation where a water softener initially leased might 
be subsequently sold. T. 44. 
But why should the burden have been on him, rather than 
on .*ri auditor or member of respondent, to raise that issue? Why 
would he be expected to anticipate a possible difference in the 
tax treatment of a sale depending on whether there had been an 
initial lease period? The ones he was talking to would have that 
expertise, not him. 
Mr. Lambourne was asked, "[D]id you ever soecifically 
ask any of the oeople that you've mentioned so far what happens 
when you first rent and then sell?" T. 44. 
In response he stated, "I did not ask that soecific 
question. I asked what a water softener was considered to be, 
real property or personal property. And I was told that it was 
real property. There were no stipulations to it. I had no reason 
to ask any other question than that question. I wanted to know 
how the Tax Commission looked at a water softener transaction. 
And that was the question that I asked." Id. 
Why should it have occurred to Mr. Lambourne to have 
asked that other question? If a layman were told that a sale of 
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his home was a sale of real property for sales tax ourposes, would 
it be expected that he would check again if he rented his home for 
a while before he sold it? 
In view of the fact that good faith existed just as much 
before May 5, 1988 as after, why was petitioner required to pay 
from its own pocket those taxes it found out after 1986 that it 
should have been collecting in 1985 and 1986? If it was inapproprate 
to give retroactive effect to the February 27, 1991 Order for the 
period between May 5, 1988 and March 1, 1991 in view of the lack 
of clarity (R. 52-53), why wasn't it just as harsh and unjust 
to give retroactive effect to that Order for the period of January 
1985-December 1986 in view of the lack of clarity that existed 
then? 
There is a lack of logic and reason to this variant 
treatment that does not warrant this Courtfs deference to the 
Final Decision. That Final Decision was not within the bounds of 
reasonableness that would prevent the agency's decision from being 
disturbed. Morton, supra, at 586. 
4 . RESPONDENT VIOLATED PETITIONER ? S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY REQUIRING 
PETITIONER TO REMIT MUCH MORE SALES TAX THAN PETITIONER HAD COLLECTED 
FROM BUYERS WHO EACH PURCHASED A WATER SOFTENER AFTER EVEN A 
MINIMAL PERIOD OF LEASING IT WHERE IN GOOD FAITH PETITIONER HAD 
COLLECTED THE SAME AMOUNT OF SALES TAX AS RESPONDENT'S RULES 
REQUIRED BE COLLECTED FROM A BUYER WHO BOUGHT A WATER SOFTENER 
WITHOUT FIRST LEASING IT. 
The due process clauses of the Utah Constitution, Article 
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1, Section 7, and the United States Constitution, Fourteenth 
Amendment, each provides that Utah shall not deorive any person of 
property without due process of law. 
In the case of Athayv. State, Deot. of Business Regulation , 
626 P. 2d 965 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that 
a failure of a State agency to establish guidelines deorived a 
party to that action of rights of due process of law, citing several 
federal and state decisions. 
As a general rule, if a statute is too vague (and this 
is not remedied by aopropriate administrative rules ) , then enforcement 
ignores procedural due process because there is insufficient notice. 
"Vagueness" goes to the issue of procedural 
due process, i.e., whether the statute is 
sufficiently explicit and clear to inform the 
ordinary reader of common intelligence what 
conduct is orohibited. State v. Hoffman, 733 
P.2d 502 (Utah 1987). [Emphasis added.] 
If a statute deprives a oerson of orooerty on the basis 
of a statute that is not "sufficiently exolicit and clear to 
inform the ordinary reader of common intelligence what conduct is 
prohibited," then there is a violation of the due process clauses 
of the Utah and United States constitutions. 
A criminal statute "must be sufficiently 
clear and definite to inform persons of ordinary 
intelligence what their conduct must be to 
conform to its requirements and to advise one 
accused of violatinq it what constitutes the 
offense with which he is charged. " [Citations . ] 
A statute that does not meet this test is 
invalid under both the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment to the federal 
constitution, [citation], and its counterpart 
in article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986). 
[Emphasis added.] 
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In the instant matter, there was no statute or rule or 
anything else that was "sufficiently clear and definite to inform 
persons of ordinary intelligence what their conduct must be to 
conform to its requirements" with respect to the collection of 
sales and use tax on a water softener leased for a few months and 
then sold. Nevertheless the small business embodied in petitioner 
has been deprived of over $15
 f 000 of its property. This deprivation 
has thus been without due process of law. 
This deprivation by the respondent, an arm of the State 
of Utah, of petitioner's due process rights protected by the 
United States Constitution, acting under the State laws of taxation, 
constitutes a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Signore v. City of McKeesport, Pa., 680 F.SUDP. 200 
(W.D.Pa. 1988). 
Even if this Court does not reach the issue of the 
violation of the United States Constitution, a reversal of the 
respondent's decision would entitle petitioner to an award of 
attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. Lorenc v. Call, 789 
P. 2d 46 (Utah App. 1990). 
In the Lorenc case, an arm of the State of Utah, namely, 
Granite School District, denied Lorenc fee waivers. She argued 
that the District policy was more restrictive than the statute, 
and that the procedures employed violated her due process rights. 
Lorenc prevailed on the basis of the policy being too restrictive, 
and the Court of Appeals did not reach the issue of due process. 
But the appellate court did recognize that the due process claim was 
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not insubstantial, and hence an award of attorney fees was appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
As provided for the rules of the respondent, leases of 
water softeners are taxable by paying sales tax on the lease 
payments, and on water softeners that are sold and installed, use 
tax is paid on the cost of the materials which are installed on 
the real property. It is unreasonable for respondent to essentially 
quadruple the sales tax on a sale if a lease is in place for one 
or two months before the water softener is sold. 
The rules of the respondent only cover either a lease or 
a sale. The respondent has not adopted any rule which requires 
that tax be paid on the total price of the water softener where an 
option to buy has been exercised during a lease. Until such a 
rule is properly oromulgated, respondent must not be allowed to 
enforce that rule. 
Since petitioner has been collecting in good faith all 
of the taxes it should have been, it is unreasonable for respondent 
to now charge petitioner over $15 ,000 for taxes it did not collect. 
Petitioner's constitutionally protected due process 
rights have been violated by respondent' s deprivation of petitioner ' s 
property under color of law. 
Based upon each of the foregoing , the petitioner oriqinally 
properly collected and remitted the correct amount of tax, and 
this Court should order that the subsequent amount collected by 
the respondent pursuant to the respondent's Decision and Order of 
February 6 , 1992 be returned, and that Decision and Order be vacated. 
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Furthermore, petitioner should be awarded its costs 
including attorney fees herein. 
DATED this 2/~" day of tftLy, , 1992. 
LYNN P. HEWARD & DELWIN T. POND 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
LYNN P. HEWARD 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four copies of this Brief were 
mailed to Susan L. Barnum, Assistant Attorney General, 36 South 
State Street, 11th Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 on this Z°i ~ 
day of rlcu^. , 1992, with postage attached thereon, 
^w 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
) 
SUPERIOR SOFT WATER COMPANY ) 
Petitioner, ) ORDER 
v
* ) 
AUDITING DIVISION, UTAH ) Appeal No. 87-1118 
STATE TAX COMMISSION : 
Respondent. : 
) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission on 
February 6, 1991 on a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification 
of Informal Decision. G. Blaine Davis, Commissioner, Joe B. 
Pacheco, Commissioner, and Paul F. Iwasaki, Administrative Law 
Judge, heard the matter for and in behalf of the Commission. 
Present and representing the Petitioner was Allen Sims, Attorney at 
Law. Present and representing Respondent was- Susan Barnum, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
The parties had filed briefs and memorandums prior to the 
hearing. The evidence is contained in the file and the facts are 
correctly stated in the Informal Decision and are not in dispute. 
However, the parties have a different interpretation of the effects 
and the practical application of the Informal Decision of the 
Commission in this case. 
The Petitioner has three different types of transactions 
with its customers who want a water softener unit. Water Softeners 
are provided on one of the following bases: 
1. The water softener is leased to the customer on a 
monthly rental agreement, which usually results in a rental period 
of two to three years. Sales tax is imposed on the monthly lease 
payment as it is received by the Petitioner, and there is no 
dispute between the parties as to how these transactions are taxed. 
2. The water softener is sold to the customer on a 
furnish and install contract. On this type of transaction, the 
Petitioner furnishes the materials and supplies, and installs them 
as a water softener on the premises of the customer. Pursuant to 
Commission Rule R865-19-58S, the Petitioner pays sales and use tax 
on its cost of materials, i.e., Petitioner either pays sales tax to 
the vendor when materials are purchased, or, if the materials are 
purchased without the payment of sales tax, the Petitioner pays use 
tax when the materials are attached to real property. There is no 
dispute between the parties as to how these transactions are taxed. 
3. The water softener is leased to the customer for a 
period of time, but prior to the expiration of the lease the 
customer purchases the water softener. In relation to this appeal 
and pursuant to a special promotion of the Petitioner, many 
purchases were during the first three months of the lease, and 
customers were given credit against the purchase price for the 
payments which they had made on the lease. The transactions which 
are in dispute in this proceeding are those where the purchase 
occurred during the period of the original lease, regardless of 
whether the purchase occurred after only three months or after a 
2 
much longer period of time. The parties have a different 
interpretation of the Order of the Commission# and the Commission 
has been asked for its interpretation of the Order as it pertains 
to these transactions. 
A portion of the Findings of the Informal Decision 
relating to these transactions reads as follows: 
"Water softeners which are first leased to a 
customer and then sold to that customer are 
subject to tax on the monthly rental payments 
for the duration of the lease, and are subject 
to sales and use tax on the residual sales 
price on the later sale of the water softener 
to that customer. Separate transactions will 
have occurred. There is no double taxation." 
The Decision and Order of the Informal Decision relating 
to these transactions reads as follows: 
"Based on the foregoing, it is the Decision 
and Order of the Utah State Tax Commission 
that water softeners which are sold outright 
to the customer and installed become part of 
the realty. Water softeners which are leased 
to a customer remain personal property. Water 
softeners which are first leased and then sold 
to a customer become part of the realty at the 
time of the sale. 
The Auditing Division is hereby ordered to 
adjust its assessment in accordance with this 
decision." 
The position of the Petitioner is that the Decision and 
Order is the language that governs when it states that, "Water 
softeners which are first leased and then sold to a customer become 
part of the realty at the time of the sale." The interpretation of 
the Petitioner is that because it is converted to realty at the 
time of sale, it should be taxed the same as the sales which are 
made on a furnish and install contract, i. e., taxes should be 
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charged only on the cost of materials. They also point out that if 
their interpretation of the Decision is not correct, then there is 
no need for the language which orders the Auditing Division to 
"adjust its assessment in accordance with this decision." 
The position of the Respondent is that the wording in the 
Findings accurately describes how these transactions are to be 
taxed, when it states they "are subject to sales and use tax on the 
residual sales price on the later sale of the water softener to 
that customer. Separate Transactions will have occurred." 
Upon a reading of the Informal Decision, it is apparent 
that the Decision is not clear. It is understandable why the 
parties do not agree on the interpretation of the Decision and why 
it requires further interpretation. 
The Commission has reviewed the arguments and authorities 
presented by the parties, and the statutes and rules relating to 
the sales and use tax. Based on that review, The Commission now 
makes and enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. Purchases of water softeners by customers, either 
during or upon the completion of a lease, are taxable sales by the 
Petitioner. Thus, for example, if the sale is for $950.00 less 
three lease payments of $12.95 each, or a total of $38.85, then 
sales tax must be collected on the purchase price of $911.15 
Sales tax would have already been collected on the $38.85 of lease 
payments. This is what was meant in the Findings of Fact when it 
stated that such sales after a lease were "subject to sales and use 
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tax on the residual sales price on the later sale of the water 
softener to that customer." 
2. The above interpretation is also what was intended by 
the Decision and Order which stated, "Water softeners which are 
leased to a customer remain personal property. Water softeners 
which are first leased and then sold to a customer become part of 
the realty at the time of ^ale." The interpretation of the 
Commission of those two sentences is that the water softeners that 
are leased have not become real property but remain personal 
property. Because the water softeners were personal property until 
they were leased, they remain personal property when they ar£ 
purchased by the customer. Therefore, the full purchase price of 
the water softeners, less the lease payments where applicable, is 
subject to sales tax. Only after purchase do the leased wat§r 
softeners become part of the realty. 
3. The original audit assessment determined by the 
Auditing Division was and is affirmed. The sentence in the 
original Informal Decision ordering the Auditing Division to adjust 
its assessment was a standard provision which is placed in most 
orders. That sentence was not intended to relieve the Petitioner 
from any responsibility to pay taxes. 
4. Because the Petitioner may well have made a good faith 
misinterpretation of the Informal Decision, there may not have been 
a collection of tax in accordance with the intent of that Decision. 
Therefore, if the Petitioner has not collected tax on the full 
purchase price of the water softeners in accordance with the above 
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interpretation, the Commission will waive any tax, penalty and 
interest which Petitioner did not collect between May 5, 1988 and 
March l, 1991 which resulted from its misinterpretation of that 
Decision. This waiver is intended to apply only to the tax, 
penalty and interest which may have been caused by the lack of 
clarity of the Informal Decision, 
Dated this <Q*1 day of F^HJULQIAAX^ 1991. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
Chairman 
Joe B, Pacheco 
Commissioner 
G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for a Formal Hearing. 
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